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Threat-Based Approach 
•  SHIRA is the result of an integrated 
“fusion” effort between the Infrastructure 
Protection and Intelligence Communities 
•  Similar to Military Decision Making 
Process where intelligence initiates the 
planning and all functional areas participate 
in the entire process 
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Military Analogy to Risk 




** ARMY Field Manual 7-30 
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Simplified SHIRA Work Flow 
HITRAC, SSAs, 
and IC Define 
Threat Themes 
SSAs Assess Vulnerability 
and Consequence 







Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence 
 
R = P × C  
 
P = TP × VP  
 
R = (TP × VP) × C  
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Supporting Strategic Risk Assessments 
 To form a strategy to reduce the risk from 
terrorist attacks, decision-makers need a 
threat assessment based on intelligence and 
supporting evidence so that they can 
–  compare the severity of several threats,  
–  understand the degree of certainty in the 
assessment, and  
–  determine the potential for change.  
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Yet, in the political arena, invulnerability is the standard by which 
homeland security policies are judged. Washington think tanks, 
federal agencies, and government commissions have produced a 
steady stream of reports since 9/11 detailing the myriad 
vulnerabilities of the homeland and the insufficiency of the 
government response before and after 9/11. The attack scenarios 
they present demonstrate a degree of imaginative thinking that 
even the innovative strategists of Al Qa’eda could never match. 
Moreover, the scenarios are often connected only to 
vulnerabilities, not to threats. Each type of attack is said to be 
plausible, regardless of whether any particular actor in the world 
has both the desire and the capacity to carry it out. A vaguely 
defined enemy, usually labeled ‘Al Qa’eda,’ is assumed to be 
willing and capable of doing essentially anything.  
–  Jeremy Shapiro, “Managing Homeland Security: Develop a Threat-Based 




•  The focus is on  
–  Capability to launch an attack and  
–  Intent to attack a CI/KR sector 
•  Capability is based on  
–  Historical attacks 
–  Intelligence about capability 
–  Intelligence about the intent to acquire a capability 
•  Intent is based on 
–  Degree of interest in a sector 
–  Historical attacks 
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Tables for Estimated Capability 
0 1 2 3 4 
Demonstrated 
Capability 
No evidence of existing 
capability to execute the 
attack  
Evidence of existing 




capability confirmed by 
credible intelligence  
Domestic operational 
capability confirmed by 
credible intelligence 
0 1 2 3 4 
Effort to 
Acquire 
No effort to acquire the 
capability  
Pursing the capability 
by attempting to 
develop internal 
expertise, obtain 
materials, or recruit 
experts  
Adversary has an 
organized attempt to 
obtain either materials or 
expertise needed to 
advance the capability  
Adversary has internal 
training, expertise, and 
access to materials 
required to develop the 
capability 
Adversary has training 
or operational plans to 
develop the capability to 
launch an attack in the 
United States  
Intelligence feeds the “Effort to Acquire.” 
This provides an idea of the level of effort 
to advance the capability.  
The criteria represent progress 
toward the next highest level of 
capability 
History and Intelligence feed 
the “Demonstrated Capability.”  
These rankings can be based 
on intelligence assessments of 
capability, not just historical 
evidence.  
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Intent to Attack 
The evaluation for intent to attack 
requires many more judgments. 
Every attack method is assessed 
for every CI/KR sector (i.e., every 
scenario).  
Each scenario is ranked based on  
ü    intelligence analysis 
ü    historical precedent  
ü    sector tier (from the grants threat process) 
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Intent to Attack: Rankings 
A Intelligence indicates a heightened interest in using the attack method against the sector in the 
United States or Western Europe (e.g., operational plan or attack, or credible source, multiple 
reports, sustained interest, etc.). 
B Intelligence indicates a moderate interest in using the attack method against the 
sector in the United States or Western Europe (e.g., multiple reports from different 
sources of varying credibility, recurring interest, etc.) 
C Intelligence indicates a weak interest in using the attack method against the sector in the 
United States or Western Europe (e.g., few reports of less than credible sources, anecdotal 
interest, etc.) 
D Any group has had a successful attack, failed attack, or disrupted operational plan to 
launch an attack against the sector outside of the United States or Western Europe 
using the attack method described 
Tier 1 There is a body of evidence or credible reporting and analysis including multiple 
threat or threat streams originating from numerous sources regarding the intent of the 
group being evaluated to attack the sector in the United States. 
Tier 2 There is credible reporting and analysis depicting a threat originating from a single 
source or a limited set of sources regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to 
attack the sector in the United States 
Tier 3 There is reporting depicting threat or threat streams originating from sources of 
undetermined credibility regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to attack 
the sector in the United States 
Tier 4 There is no known information or analysis concerning a terrorist threat to the sector 
in the United States. 
The ranking table supports an evaluation 
of the evidence for a group’s intent to 
attack. 
The highest three rankings reflect 
stronger support from intelligence or 
history.  
The middle ranking shows the historical 
precedent for the attack, which shows a 
degree of fitness between an attack 
method and a sector. This establishes a 
baseline for such attacks. 
The lowest four rankings reflect weaker 
support from intelligence and the extent 
to which the sector in general may be 
targeted.  
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Threat Analysis: Integration 
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Vulnerability and Consequence 
Framework 
•  Similar to the threat assessment 
–  Define thresholds and provide ranking guidance for the 
infrastructure protection community of interest 
–  DHS works with SSAs to assess vulnerability and 
consequences associated with each attack method 
•  SSAs apply an attack method to an asset, 
representative asset, or system in their sector that 
represents the worst-most likely scenario 
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Vulnerability Ranking Table 
Vulnerability Level 
0 1 2 3 4 
Recognizability 
(Rg) 
Asset is very unlikely to 
be recognized; adversary 
would require a highly 
trained expert or access to 
classified or highly 
sensitive information  
Asset is unlikely to be 
recognized; an 
adversary would 
require some special 
knowledge or training  
Asset is somewhat likely to 
be recognized; an adversary 
would require a moderate 
amount of research  
Asset is likely to be 
recognized; an 
adversary could 
identify this asset will 
minimal effort.  
Asset is very likely to 
be recognized; any 
adversary could easily 




The countermeasures are 
very likely to defeat the 
attack. 
The counter-measures 
are likely to defeat the 
attack. 
The countermeasures are 
somewhat likely to defeat 
the attack. 
The counter-measures 
are unlikely to defeat 
the attack. 
The counter-measures 
in place are very 





The asset is very likely to 
resist, withstand, or 
contain the damage from 
the attack.  
The asset is likely to 
resist, withstand, or 
contain the damage 
from the attack  
The asset is somewhat 
likely to resist, withstand, or 
contain the damage from 
the attack.  
The asset is unlikely to 
resist, withstand, or 
contain the damage 
from the attack.  
The asset is very 
unlikely to resist, 
withstand, or contain 
the damage from the 
attack.  








Consequence Ranking Table 
Component 
Ranking Level (SHIRA Severity) 
0 
None/ Negligible 1 Minor 2 Moderate 3 Significant 4 Catastrophic/ Severe 
Loss of Life 
Attack likely to 
produce no fatalities Attack likely to cause less than 100 fatalities Attack likely to cause greater than 100 
fatalities 
Attack likely to cause 
greater than 1,000 
fatalities 
Attack likely to cause 
greater than 10,000 
fatalities 
Economic Losses 
Estimated costs from 
the attack are likely 
less than $100 million 
Estimated costs from the 
attack are relatively 
minor, in the range of 
$100 million  to $1 billion 
Estimated costs from the 
attack in the range of $1 
billion to $10 billion  
Estimated costs from 
the attack in the 
range of $10 billion to 
$100 billion  
Estimated costs from the 
attack in excess of $100 
billion  
Psychological Impact 
No major change in 
population behavior, 
or effects on social 
functioning locally or 
nationally.  
Occasional or minor loss 
of nonessential social 
functions in a 
circumscribed 
geographical area.  
Loss of many 
nonessential social 
functions in a 
circumscribed 





functions for a 
sustained period.  
Loss of belief in 
government and 
institutions; widespread 
disregard for official 
instructions; widespread 
looting and civil unrest.  
C = [(L + E + P) / 3]    
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Conclusion 
The risk ratings are used to 
compare the risks faced by 
a sector or associated with 




































































Work with the SSAs 
to Assess 
Vulnerability	

